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Absolute Privilege and California Civil
Code Section 47 (2): A Need for
Consistency
Defamatory' statements frequently occur within the context of judi-
cial proceedings, a frequency enhanced by the adversarial nature of our
legal system. If these statements are allowed to become the bases of
actions for damages against the speakers, litigation becomes the source
of litigation, and individuals are deterred from participating in the ju-
dicial system. To encourage free access to the courts and to ensure the
effectiveness of judicial proceedings through free communication, the
California Legislature enacted Civil Code section 47(2).2 Section 47(2)
grants a privileged status to publications or broadcasts made in judicial
proceedings? The privilege is absolute4 and, therefore, provides an im-
1. Injurious to reputation; libelous; slanderous. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 376 (5th ed.
1979).
2. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text infra (original enactment). Civil Code section 47
defines privileged publications. Some of the privileges are absolute, others are qualified. The
code section reads:
A privileged publication or broadcast is one made-
I. In the proper discharge of an official duty.
2. In any (1) legislative or (2) judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other official proceeding
authorized by law, or (4) in initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by
law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1084) of Title I of
Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure; provided, that an allegation or averment con-
tained in any pleading or affidavit filed in an action for divorce or an action prosecuted
under Section 137 of this code made of or concerning a person by or against whom no
affirmative relief is prayed in such action shall not be a privileged publication or broad-
cast as to the person making said allegation or averment within the meaning of this
section unless such pleading be verified or affidavit sworn to, and be made without mal-
ice, by one having reasonable and probable cause for believing the truth of such allega-
tion or averment and unless such allegation or averment be material and relevant to the
issues in such action.
3. In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is
also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such relation to the person interested as to
afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication innocent, or
(3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information.
4. By a fair and true report in a public journal, of (I) a judicial, (2) legislative, or
(3) other public official proceeding, or (4) of anything said in the course thereof, or (5) of
a verified charge or complaint made by any person to a public official, upon which com-
plaint a warrant shall have been issued.
5. By a fair and true report of (1) the proceedings of a public meeting, if such meeting
was lawfully convened for a lawful purpose and open to the public, or (2) the publication
of the matter complained of was for the public benefit.
CAL. CIV. CODE §47.
3. The term "judicial proceedings," as used herein, includes quasi-judicial proceedings.
4. Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 379, 295 P.2d 405, 408 (1956); Donnell v. Linforth, 11
Cal. App. 2d 25, 28, 52 P.2d 937, 938-39 (1935).
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munity from liability for defamatory statements made in judicial
proceedings.
In theory, the statute provides certain and undeviating protection to
judicial participants for publications made in the course of a proceed-
ing. In practice, however, protection afforded by the statute is not cer-
tain and undeviating. Instead, the immunity varies with time and
between appellate districts.5 The courts use various considerations in
determining the scope and application of the privilege, including pol-
icy, the status of the participant in relation to the proceeding, the na-
ture of the publication,6 the character of the defendant's conduct, and
the relevance of the publication to the matter being adjudicated.7
Problems of uncertainty and inconsistency arise when each court, with-
out guidance from definitive language in either the statute or in Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decisions, determines which considerations and
standards are applicable. The greatest inconsistency among the courts
occurs with the consideration of relevance. Some courts hold that the
privilege is without limitation;8 other courts append a minimal rele-
vance limitation;9 and still other courts impose rigid relevance limita-
tions.10 This inconsistency has an inhibitory effect on the free flow of
communication necessary to the success of judicial proceedings. The
need for consistency is important to all judicial participants, but is es-
pecially important to attorneys, since they have increased exposure to
suits by virtue of the volume and nature of the communications re-
quired in their roles as advocates.
The purpose of this comment is to determine the scope of the privi-
lege granted by section 47(2) to publications made in judicial proceed-
ings, to point out the inconsistent views of the courts that have lead to
unequal application of the privilege, and to make suggestions designed
to bring about more uniform protection. The historical development of
section 47(2) vill provide the background for a discussion of the meth-
ods used by courts to define and limit the privilege. The considerations
of policy, participant status, nature of the publication, and character of
5. See, for example, the inconsistent application of relevance to limit the privilege. See
notes 147-221 and accompanying text infra.
6. In the law of libel, publication means "the act of making the defamatory matter known
publicly, of disseminating it, or communicating it to one or more persons." BLACK's LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1105 (5th ed. 1979).
7. See notes 43-48, 70-79, 96-100, 138-142, 117-136, and accompanying text, infra for the
courts' use of these considerations.
8. E.g., 11 Cal. App. 2d at 29, 52 P.2d at 939; Moore v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
122 Cal. App. 205, 210-11, 9 P.2d 562, 564 (1932).
9. Eg., Thornton v. Rhoden, 245 Cal. App. 2d 80, 90, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706, 713-14 (1966)
(some relation to the judicial proceeding); Jordan v. Lemaire, 222 Cal. App. 2d 622, 625, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 339 (1963) (some reference to the judicial function).
10. See Bradley v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 824-25, 106 Cal. Rptr.
718, 721-22 (1973).
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the defendant's conduct will be explored to illustrate how the courts
determine the scope and application of the privilege and to support
proposals aimed at bringing about uniformity in appellate court deci-
sions. Finally, the judicially-appended limitation of relevance will be
discussed, and a recommendation will be made to the legislature to
incorporate the limitation into the statute by amendment. Before ex-
ploring the considerations used by the courts to determine scope and
application of the privilege, the historical development of absolute
privilege in California will be examined.
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE: BACKGROUND
Privilege is one of the primary defenses to an action in defamation"
and may be either qualified or absolute. The former is lost through
excessive publication or publication with malice. 2 The latter, an im-
munity from liability, 13 is granted on occasions in which the interest of
society in unfettered communication outweighs the concern for an indi-
vidual's reputation.' 4 A judicial proceeding is an occasion of that kind.
In California, absolute privilege for defamatory statements made in
judicial proceedings is codified in Civil Code section 47(2). Applica-
tion of the privilege by California courts is best understood with some
knowledge of the history of this code section.
Section 47 originated with the adoption of the Civil Code in 1872.11
11. Defamation in California is defined in Civil Code sections 44, 45, and 46:
Defamation: Defamation is effected by either of the following: (a) Libel. (b) Slander.
Id. §44.
Libel. Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or
other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt,
ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a
tendency to injure him in his occupation.
Id. §45 (emphasis added).
Slander. Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, and also commu-
nications by radio or any mechanical or other means which:
1. Chares any person with a crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or pun-
ished for crime;,
2. Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome
disease;
3. Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade or business,
either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or
other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his
office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits;
4. Imputes to him impotence or want of chastity; or
5. Which, by natural consequence, causes actual damage.
Id. §46 (emphasis added). See generally PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§l 11-113
(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
12. I.A. HANSON, LIBEL Case and Comment 124, 143 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
HANSON].
13. R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 268 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
SACK].
14. HANSON, supra note 12, at 85.
15. Enacted March 21, 1872. For historical background see generally Kleps, The Revision
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As initially enacted, subsection 2 granted a privilege limited in scope.16
Protection was confined to the publications of a single participant class,
that of witnesses; and unless the statements were made in reply to a
question allowed by the tribunal, they were required to bepertinent and
material to the matter at hand. 17
Shortly after 1872 a new code committee suggested revisions to the
Civil Code.18 One of the revisions was an amendment which resulted
in significant changes to Civil Code section 47(2).19 The requirements
of pertinency and materiality were deleted, and the wording was broad-
ened to encompass publications by participants in a variety of proceed-
ings. A privileged publication became one made "in any legislative or
judicial proceeding, or in any other official proceeding."20 The incon-
sistencies in judicial construction and application of the privilege began
with this amendment. =1
Over a half-century later, a further amendment to section 47(2)22
gave the courts new material to aid in construing the intent of the Leg-
islature regarding the scope of the privilege. This amendment changed
the absolute privilege to a conditional privilege in a single subclass of
judicial proceedings-divorce proceedings. The divorce provision
placed express limitations on the publication before the privilege would
attach.23 These express limitations were used by some courts to con-
and Codfcation of California Statutes 1849-1953, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 766, 772 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as Kleps]; Parma & Armstrong, The Codes and Statutes of Calfornia.- A Bibliography, 22
LAw. LIBR. J. 41, 43 (1929); Comment, The First Half-Century of the Caif/ornia Civil Code, 10
CALIF. L. RaV. 185, 187 (1922).
16. "A privileged publication is one made... (2) in testfying as a witness in any proceeding
authorized by law to a matterpertinent andmaterial, or in reply to a question allowed by a tribunal"
(emphasis added). WEST'S ANNOTATED CIVIL CODE, Section 47 Historical Note at 188.
17. Pertinency and materiality comprise the common law requirement of relevance under the
American rule of absolute privilege in judicial proceedings. PROSSER, supra note 11, §114, at 778.
18. See Kleps, supra note 15, at 777.
19. AMENDMENTS TO CODES 1873-74, c. 612, §11, at 184.
20. Id.
21. The Legislature attempted to clarify the scope of the privilege in 1901 when a third code
commission proposed substantial amendments to the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure,
and the Penal Code. The changes were introduced and passed by the Legislature in three bills.
The revision to the Code of Civil Procedure was declared unconstitutional in Lewis v. Dunne, 134
Cal. 291,293, 66 P. 478,479 (1901). Kleps, supra note 15, at 782-83. The effect of the decision was
to invalidate the revisions to all three codes. Among the invalidated revisions to the Civil Code
was an amendment to section 47(2) limiting the privilege: "But irrelevant or immaterial matter
voluntarily and maliciously published in the course of a judicialproceeding is not privileged."
AMENDMENTS TO THE CODES 1900, c. 157, §10, at 334 (emphasis added).
22. In 1927 the internal numbering was inserted and the proviso on divorce proceedings was
added:
provided, that an allegation or averment contained in any pleading or affidavit filed in
an action for divorce ... shall not be aprivileged publication ... unless such pleading
be verified or sworn to, and be made without malice, by one having reasonable and prob-
able cause for believing the truth of such allegation or averment and unless ... material
and relevant to the issues in such action.
CAL. STATS. 1927, c. 866, §1 at 1881 (emphasis added).
23. See note 22 supra for express provision.
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strue an absence of restrictions on the balance of section 47(2).24 Other
courts have used the wording of the entire code section,25 the wording
of the amendments to subsection 2,26 and the common-law rule of ab-
solute privilege27 to determine whether the legislature intended to re-
strict the immunity.28 Case law reveals that, in adjudging the limits of
the privilege, the courts have given inconsistent weight to the consider-
ations of policy,29 the relationship of the participant to the proceed-
ing,30 the nature of the publication and theory of recovery, 31 the
availability of alternative sanctions,32 and the character of the defend-
ant's conduct.33 When courts enlist different considerations and stan-
dards to apply the privilege, the result is uncertainty in the law, an
uncertainty that hinders achieving the objectives of the privilege.
CONSIDERATIONS IN DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE
3 4
"An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but re-
sults in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no
privilege at all. ''3  If the purpose of the privilege is to be served, the
judicial participant must feel with some degree of certainty that his
statements will not result in tort liability. One way for the courts to
reduce inconsistency and to provide this degree of certainty for judicial
participants is to focus on the policy behind the rule.
A. Policy. The Rationale Behind the Rule
The objective or purpose of any law is found in the policy behind the
rule. Policy is at once the moving force that justifies the existence of
the law and the unifying factor that results in homogeneous application
of the law. 6 A basic policy statement, derived from past decisions and
24. See notes 182-185 and accompanying text infra.
25. See notes 2, 16 supra.
26. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra.
27. Stated in Wyatt v. Buell, 47 Cal. 624, 624-25 (1874), a case decided before the 1873-74
amendment effectively extended the privilege to include all judicial participants.
28. But see California Civil Code section 4 for legislatively mandated construction of the
Civil Code.
29. See notes 42-55 and accompanying text infra.
30. See notes 70-84 and accompanying text infra.
31. See notes 94-110 and accompanying text infra.
32. See notes 137-146 and accompanying text infra.
33. See notes 117-136 and accompanying text infra.
34. For a better understanding of the discussion on considerations and limitations, the reader
should keep in mind that the focus of absolute privilege is the proceeding in which the publication
occurs. The proceeding, and society's interest in protecting the occasion cloaks the publication
with immunity and allows the defendant to escape liability. Seegeneraly PROSSER, spra note II,
§114, at 777-81.
35. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (an evidentiary privilege rather
than a privilege that limits liability).
36. See HANSON, supra note 12, 111, 142; Veeder, 4bsolute Immunity in Defamalion" Judi-
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adopted by the California Supreme Court, would provide this neces-
sary focalization. As background for the policy discussion and propo-
sal, the various reasons advanced for granting an absolute privilege to
judicial publications will be reviewed.
. Policy Considerations Historically
By granting freedom from personal liability for defamatory state-
ments made incident to the proceeding, 37 absolute privilege promotes
effectiveness of judicial proceedings and prevents the operation of the
legal process itself from becoming the basis of further litigation.38
Since the immunity limits the potential for expenditure of time and
money in defense of litigation, a free flow of information by and be-
tween participants is encouraged. 9 In essence, the rule of absolute
privilege encourages use of the courts to settle disputes and facilitates
the search for truth.40 Similar policy objectives may be extracted from
decisions of California courts to formulate a basic policy statement for
section 47(2).
2. A Policy Statement for Section 47(2)
Development and adoption of a basic policy statement will provide
focalization for applying the privilege and thus promote consistency in
decisions between appellate districts. Since the focus of section 47(2) is
the proceeding in which the publication occurs,41 the statement should
reflect dual objectives--effectiveness of, and access to, judicial
proceedings.
The second part of this dual objective is set out in Albertson v.
Raboff,42 an opinion authored by Justice Traynor. The case involved
an action for disparagement of title based on the filing of a lispendens.
In holding the filing privileged, Justice Traynor asserted that the pur-
pose of section 47(2) was to provide parties maximum freedom of ac-
cess to the courts to uphold and defend their rights without
apprehension of becoming defendants in subsequent actions for
defamation.43
cal Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REv. 465-68 (1909) [hereinafter cited as Veeder]; see generaly
PROSSER, supra note 11, §114, at 777-78.
37. Veeder, supra note 36, at 463.
38. Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 314, 321 (1935).
39. See Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875,917-18 (1956) (litiga-
tion of facts is required with a qualified privilege).
40. See HANSON, supra note 12, 108.
41. See notes 52-67 and accompanying text infra.
42. 46 Cal. 2d 375, 380, 295 P.2d 405, 409 (1956).
43. Id. See also Veeder, supra note 36, at 469.
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Several years later in Bradley v. HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co. ,'
an appellate court expanded Justice Traynor's policy statement by as-
serting that the purpose of section 47 was also to promote the un-
hampered administration of justice.45 If the court meant that an
additional objective of the privilege was to promote the effectiveness of
the proceedings, then the expanded statement would have been an im-
provement. Unfortunately, such an intention is not clear from the
opinion. Instead, to the consternation of later courts, 46 the Bradley
court used the additional phrase as a limitation on the privilege.47 The
court said, in essence, that only when the defamatory publication pro-
motes the interests of justice is the statute to be liberally applied.4 The
wording of the expanded statement consequently confuses rather than
clarifies policy, and thus does not promote uniform application of the
privilege.
A policy statement incorporating the dual objectives of the privilege
and approved in a California Supreme Court opinion will promote ho-
mogeneous application of the statute by providing a unifying theme. A
suggested statement is as follows: The purpose of section 47(2) is to
promote the peaceful and timely disposition of legal matters or disputes
by affording freedom of access to the courts and other quasi-judicial
agencies without fear of legal actions based on defamatory statements
made in the course of a proceeding.
This statement is broad enough to encompass publications of all ju-
dicial participants, including judges, witnesses, jurors, parties, and at-
torneys, as well as publications of persons in comparable roles with
quasi-judicial agencies and commissions. The "course of a proceed-
ing" includes publications made in contemplation of, initiation of, or
conduction of a proceeding, as well as publications made to effectuate
the result of the proceeding. Furthermore, the statement does not in-
hibit other considerations and limitations on the privilege, nor does it
44. 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 106 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1973).
45. Id. at 823, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 721. The phrase used by the Bradley court also appears in
Abbot v. Tacoma Bank of Commerce, 175 U.S. 409, 411 (1899), and in Veeder, supra note 36, at
478.
46. One court's comment:
We must confess that we are uncertain as to what the Bradley court meant when it said
that the defamatory publication must 'promote the interest ofjustice' to be accorded the
absolute privilege....
It seems reasonably certain that the Legislature did not immunize a defamer from
liability for his defamation because it thought that a defamatory publication in a judicial
proceeding promoted 'the interest of justice.'
O'Neill v. Cunningham, 118 Cal. App. 3d 466, 475, 173 Cal. Rptr. 422, 427 (1981).
47. 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 826, 106 Cal. Rptr. 718, 723 (1973). Statements were held not privi-
leged because they were extrajudicial, "[b]ut most of all, [because] they were not made. . . to
promote the unfettered administration of justice." Id. at 828, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
48. Id. at 826, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 721, 723. It is difficult to conceive of any defamatory publi-
cation which would promote the interests of justice.
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prevent the use of policy statements specifically adapted to a single
class of judicial participants, such as attorneys.
Attorneys are frequently the defendants in tort actions based on de-
famatory statements made in the course of a proceeding, and appellate
court decisions applying the privilege to attorney publications are often
the most digparate 9 For counsel, the privilege promotes zealous client
representation by granting full freedom of speech in representing and
advocating the client's cause 5°---an attorney's primary functions.-"
Since the attorney is a principal means of access to the courts and other
agencies, protecting attorney publications advances the basic policy
objectives suggested for section 47(2)-unencumbered access to the
courts and timely, peaceful settlement of disputes. The basic policy
objectives that justify protecting attorney publications also justify pro-
tecting the publications of other communicants in a judicial proceed-
ing. To successfully assert the privilege, however, a communicant must
have participant status, and the publication must have occurred "in" a
judicial proceeding.
B. Judicial Proceeding and Particioant Status
The focus of the absolute privilege in section 47(2) is the proceeding
in which the communication occurs.52 The privilege is not confined to
the traditional courtroom setting, but extends to quasi-judicial proceed-
ings, such as administrative hearings of hospital boards53 and hearings
before agencies charged with overseeing professional conduct. 4 Thus,
the traditional participant labels of attorney, party, witness, judge, and
juror do not comprise an exhaustive list of those with potential stand-
49. See, e.g., 118 Cal. App. 3d 466, 173 Cal. Rptr. 422 (breach ofethics does not abrogate the
privilege); Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 66 Cal. App. 3d 893, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1977)
(breach of ethics is inconsistent with a privileged status).
50. See Hollis v. Meux, 69 Cal. 625, 628, 11 P. 248,250 (1886) (attorney publication, made in
opposition to an insolvency action, accusing an insolvent debtor of intent to defraud his creditors,
held privileged). Veeder, supra note 36, at 482, states: "[T]o subject [counsel] to actions for defa-
mation would fetter and restrain him in the fearless discharge of the duty which he owes to his
client, and which the successful administration ofjustice demands." See also the dissent in the
vacated first California Supreme Court decision of Albertson v. Raboff, 287 P.2d 145, 148 (1955),
rehg granted, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295 P.2d 405 (1956) (new decision).
51. Smith v. Hatch, 271 Cal. App. 2d 39, 50, 76 Cal. Rptr. 350, 357 (1969) (letter from an
attorney to his client asserting misappropriation of association funds by the opposing party);
Friedman v. Knecht, 248 Cal. App. 2d 455, 462, 56 Cal. Rptr. 540, 545 (1967) (defamatory state-
ments of prosecuting attorney to defense counsel during request for continuance); RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS §586 comment c (1976) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
52. See Veeder, supra note 36, at 468.
53. Ascherman v. Natanson, 23 Cal. App. 3d 861, 864, 100 Cal. Rptr. 656, 658-59 (1972). But
see Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465, 481-82, 551 P.2d 410, 420, 131
Cal. Rptr. 90, 100 (1976), in which the California Supreme Court makes it clear that section 47(2)
is applicable only to statements made in a board proceeding and not to actioni of the board.
54. See King v. Borges, 28 Cal. App. 3d 27, 34, 104 Cal. Rptr. 414, 416 (1972) (letter from an
attorney, on behalf of his purchaser-client, to the Real Estate Commissioner regarding unethical
actions of a real estate broker).
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ing to assert the privilege.5" To come within the privilege, the publica-
tion must occur "in" a judicial proceeding by one with participant
status.
1. The Scope of a Judicial Proceeding
The "proceeding" issue is not raised by a publication made in a
traditional criminal or civil courtroom setting. Instead, the issue arises
when the privilege is asserted to limit liability for a publication made in
a public hearing to settle a matter in dispute,5 6 or in a hearing before a
tribunal which performs judicial functions. 7 The issue may also be
raised when the privilege is asserted for a publication made incident to
the functioning of an agency, commission, or officer empowered to ap-
ply law to facts,5" to control unethical or illegal activity,59 or to investi-
gate and discipline.6 0 When the communication occurs in one of these
nontraditional settings, the court must determine whether the proceed-
ing is within the privilege-whether it qualifies as a quasi-judicial
proceeding.
Tests for determining whether an administrative body qualifies as
quasi-judicial were delineated in Ascherman v. Natanson.6' The As-
cherman court used the following inquiries to make its determination:
(1) whether the administrative body is vested with discretion based
upon investigation and consideration of evidentiary facts,
(2) whether it is entitled to hold hearings and decide the issue by the
application of rules of law to the ascertained facts and, more impor-
tantly (3) whether its power affects the personal or property rights of
private persons.
62
A judicial proceeding within the protection of section 47(2), thus, may
be any proceeding that entails a determination based on investigation
and evaluation of evidentiary facts, and that affects personal or prop-
55. See HANSON, supra note 12, 112 (recognizing the traditional labels, but including mem-
bers of an administrative body and excluding "outsiders" to the proceeding).
56. Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REv. 314, 324 (1935). See also Pettitt v. Levy, 28
Cal. App. 3d 484, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1972) (planning commission/city council hearing on zoning
variance).
57. PROSSER, supra note 11, §114, at 779; see Ascherman v. Natanson, 23 Cal. App. 3d 861,
864-66, 100 Cal. Rptr. 656, 658-60 (1972) (hospital review board hearing). See generally SACK,
supra note 13, at 284-87.
58. PROSSER, supra note 11, §114, at 779-80; see also Veeder, supra note 36, at 483-86.
59. Long v. Pinto, 126 Cal. App. 3d 946, 949, 179 Cal. Rptr. 182, 184 (1981).
60. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 33, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 416 (complaint to Real Estate Commissioner). A
more liberal application occurred in North Dakota, a state with a statute similar to California's.
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the privilege protected an employer for a notice of
employee separation filed with the Workmen's Compensation Bureau. Bureau determination of
whether compensation was payable, qualified as a "proceeding authorized by law." Stafney v.
Standard Oil Co., 299 N.W. 582, 589 (N.D. 1941).
61. 23 Cal. App. 3d 861, 100 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1972).
62. Id. at 866, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
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erty rights of individuals. To be protected, however, the communica-
tion must meet a further requirement; it must have occurred "in" the
judicial proceeding.
Section 47(2) defines a privileged publication as one made "in" a
proceeding. 3 The term, albeit seemingly clear, has not been construed
to mean that the publication must occur literally within the formal con-
fines of a court or agency. The communication may still be privileged,
even though it is made outside of the courtroom and does not invoke
any function of the court or its officers. ' The privilege thus extends to
publications made not only in a courtroom, but also to publications
made in anticipation of a proceeding,65 in preparation for a pending
action,66 or in the initiation of investigatory or formal proceedings. 7
Though the communication need not be made in the courtroom to be
privileged, the privilege may be vitiated if the communication is made
to an outsider or stranger to the proceeding. Moreover, the privilege
may be abrogated if the speaker, at the time of publication, lacked the
necessary relationship to the proceeding. 9
63. See text of the section in note 2 supra.
64. Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 381, 295 P.2d 405, 409 (1956) (filing 1ispendens).
65. Such publications include attorney-client correspondence, settlement offers, pretrial dep-
ositions, and demand letters. See Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 HARV. L. Rav. 875,
923-24 (1956); see also O'Neil v. Cunningham, 118 Cal. App. 3d 466, 173 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1981)
(letter from attorney to client/insurance company advising settlement); Lerette v. Dean Witter
Organization, 60 Cal. App. 3d 573, 131 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1976) (letter from brokerage house attor-
ney to bank requesting compromise payment to avoid lawsuit). But see Kinnamon v. Staitman &
Snyder, 66 Cal. App. 3d 893, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1977) (demand letter not privileged if words
therein may subject the attorney-author to disciplinary action by the State Bar).
66. Preparatory communications include interviews of witnesses by counsel and conferences
of parties or interested persons to organize evidence for presentation at the proceeding. See
Veeder supra note 36, at 487 n.75; see also 23 Cal. App. 3d at 865-66, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
Ascherman involved an interview of a witness by a hospital board's attorney preparatory to a
hearing before the hospital review board. The court held the communication privileged even
though a medical secretary was present at the interview. The presence of the unnecessary person
did not destroy the privilege because she had first-hand knowledge of the matters discussed and
would have also qualified as a witness. Id. at 867, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 660. See also Brody v.
Montalbano, 87 Cal. App. 3d 725, 733-34, 151 Cal. Rptr. 206, 212 (1978) (preliminary conversa-
tions by parents bringing a formal complaint against a school vice principal); Pettitt v. Levy, 28
Cal. App. 3d 484, 490-91, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650, 654 (1972) (preparation of a forged evidentiary
document). But see HANSON supra note 12, 1 111, at 87 (unnecessary persons present during
preparatory conversations could vitiate the privilege).
67. See Long v. Pinto, 126 Cal. App. 3d 946, 948-50, 179 Cal. Rptr. 182, 184-85 (1981) (letter
intended to initiate investigation of doctor's conduct); King v. Borges, 28 Cal. App. 3d 27, 33, 104
Cal. Rptr. 414, 416 (1972) (complaint to Real Estate Commissioner). But see Katz v. Rosen, 48
Cal. App. 3d 1032, 1037, 121 Cal. Rptr. 853, 856 (1975), holding that the recipient of the complaint
must be vested with investigatory or disciplinary powers for the privilege to attach.
68. See HANSON, supra note 12, 111, at 87-88.
69. See Washer v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 2d 822, 822, 136 P.2d 297, 303 (1943). In
Washer, the California Supreme Court held that statements to reporters by a disgruntled losing
party in a labor board action were not absolutely privileged. Id. at 825, 832-33, 136 P.2d at 299,
303.
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2 Particioant: A Standing Requirement
It is the relationship of the participant to the proceeding that entitles
him to speak and write with impunity 7 0 afortiori, absent the necessary
relationship the privilege is inapplicable.7" Nevertheless, courts are not
consistent in applying the privilege when it is asserted by participants
of comparable status.
In Bradley,72 plaintiff-attorneys alleged that defendants had made
statements to non-participants accusing the attorneys of suborning per-
jury.73 In addition, the attorneys alleged that defendants had filed doc-
uments at the trial and state supreme court levels solely for the purpose
of getting the perjury accusations into the news.74 In holding the publi-
cations unprivileged, the court noted that one of the defendants was
neither a witness nor a party in the previous action, and that the attor-
ney-defendant was not an attorney of record in the prior action.75
In contrast, the court in Pettitt v. Levy 76 allowed the privilege to be
asserted by one who was not a party to the proceeding, but who was an
interested member of the public.77 Similarly, in Lerette v. Dean Witter
Organization,7" the court found a publication, made in anticipation of
litigation, privileged. The privilege was allowed although the attorney-
publisher did not become the attorney of record when the action was
fled.
79
Both Bradley and Lerette involved assertion of the privilege by attor-
ney-defendants. Attorneys, judges, parties, witnesses, and jurors are
traditionally the positions to which the privilege applies. 80 When a cus-
tomary role is involved, the court may determine standing to assert the
privilege by asking only whether the subject communication was made
in the scope of the participant's relationship to the proceeding. When a
nontraditional role or a quasi-judicial proceeding is involved, however,
further inquiry may be necessary to determine standing.
One appellate court expressly conditioned successful assertion of the
70. Veeder, supra note 36, at 468. "Proceeding" as used herein includes anticipated as well as
pending or actual proceedings, and quasi-judicial as well as judicial proceedings.
71. Veeder, supra note 36, at 468.
72. 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 106 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1973).
73. Id. at 822, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 826, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
76. 28 Cal. App. 3d 484, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1972).
77. Id. at 488-89, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 652-53 (allegedly forged building permit submitted in
opposition to a zoning variance).
78. 60 Cal. App. 3d 573, 131 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1976).
79. Id. at 578-79, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 595. A demand letter from the house counsel of Dean
Witter to a potential adversary sought an out-of-court cash settlement in lieu of court action. In
the subsequent suit the authoring attorney did not participate as counsel.
80. PROSSER, supra note 11, §114, at 778. See also SACK, supra note 13, at 268-69; 4 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts §297 (8th ed. 1974).
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privilege on the status of the publisher. In Bradley, the court limited
the privilege to litigants or other participants authorized by law, but
failed to clarify the term "authorized by law."'" Thus, it is unclear
whether the Bradley limitation would prevent a participant, such as an
interested member of the public submitting documentation in opposi-
tion to a zoning variance8 2 or an investigative staff member on the judi-
cial review committee of one hospital sending a letter to the board of
directors of another hospital regarding a doctor's questionable profes-
sional practices, 83 from asserting the privilege. This lack of clarity does
not promote impartial and uniform application of the rule.84
To determine whether the publisher has the required status to assert
the privilege, the following set of questions is suggested: (1) Is the rela-
tionship of the publisher to the proceeding85 such that liability-free
communication will enhance the effectiveness of the tribunal and pro-
mote free access thereto? (2) If the policy objectives support immunity
for the status held by the publisher, was the subject publication made
within the scope of the publisher's relationship to the proceeding?86
The proposed test for the determination of standing to assert the privi-
lege, like the proposed policy statement, reflects the objectives of the
privilege. Free access and enhanced effectiveness of the proceeding
may be achieved, however, without protecting every utterance made in
a judicial proceeding. The privilege can be confined within managea-
ble boundaries if the courts limit application of the privilege to state-
ments that are defamatory in nature and limit consideration of the
theory of recovery to malicious prosecution actions.
C. The Nature of the Statement, the Theory of Recovery, and an
Exception to the Privilege
To keep the privilege within manageable bounds and to promote
equal application of section 47(2), courts must decide whether the state-
ment is of the type intended to be covered by the privilege, in other
words, whether the statement is defamatory and thus immune from lia-
81. Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 825, 106 Cal. Rptr. 718, 722
(1973).
82. E.g., 28 Cal. App. 3d at 487-88, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52 (allegedly forged building permit
submitted in opposition to a zoning variance was held privileged).
83. E.g., Long v. Pinto, 126 Cal. App. 3d 946, 948, 179 Cal. Rptr. 182, 184 (1981) (copy of
letter sent to the Board of Medical Quality Assurance, calling attention to the doctor's untsually
high frequency of operations on elderly rest home patients).
84. Nor does it advance the policy objective of free and unencumbered access to the courts
and other agencies. See Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 380, 295 P.2d 405, 409 (1956); Vee-
der, supra note 36, at 469.
85. The proceeding may be anticipated, pending, or in progress.
86. See SACK, supra note 13, at 268; Veeder, supra note 36, at 490.
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bility.8 7 When an action is based on a statement made by a participant
in a judicial proceeding, the privilege may be asserted as a defense-a
direct challenge to liability. 8 If the publication is found to be privi-
leged, then the cause of action fails, and should fail, regardless of the
theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiff.89
1. The Nature of the Statement and Theory of Recovery
Civil Code section 47 defines a privileged publication 9° as one which
occurs in particular proceedings or under particular circumstances.
The privilege has firm foundations in the law of defamation, as indi-
cated by the definition of "publication" and the placement of the sec-
tion in the Civil Code. "Publication" means communication of
defamatory material to a third person.9" In the Civil Code, section 47
immediately follows the sections on libel and slander92 as a further def-
inition of defamation and a limitation on liability.93
Accordingly, courts have generally recognized that the privilege pro-
tects judicial participants from actions in libel or slander94 for defama-
tory statements95 made in judicial proceedings. In Portman v. George
McDonald Law Corp. ,96 however, the court granted the privilege to the
nondefamatory statement of attorneys.97 In Portman, the defendant in-
surance company lost at trial and a money judgment was entered
against it. To avoid posting financial security pending appeal of the
decision, lawyers for the defendant asserted that the company was
financially sound. In actuality, the company was not financially sound
and plaintiffs lost the benefit of their judgment.9" In holding that the
privilege protected the defendant's lawyers from liability for negligent
misrepresentation, the court said that the privilege had been "ex-
87. SACK, supra note 13, at 267.
88. Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, 131 Cal. App. 3d 386, 389, 182 Cal. Rptr. 438, 439
(1982).
89. See note 109 infra.
90. See note 2 supra. The code section also defines privileged broadcasts. Assuming "broad-
cast" means dissemination by radio or television, the current use of television in the courtroom
may soon lead to appearance of the term in litigation involving assertion f the privilege in section
47(2) as a defense.
91. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1105 (5th ed. 1979).
92. California Civil Code sections 44-48.5 deal with defamation, libel, slander, and publica-
tions. See also note 11, supra.
93. 131 Cal. App. 3d at 389, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
94. See Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 380, 295 P.2d 405, 409 (1956); Lerette v. Dean
Witter Org., 60 Cal. App. 3d 573, 579, 131 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595-96 (1976).
95. See generaly Ascherman v. Natanson, 23 Cal. App. 3d 861, 865, 100 Cal Rptr. 656, 659
(1972); PROSSER, supra note 11, §114, at 777-81; Veeder, supra note 36 (even the title of Veeder's
article indicates the type of statement protected by the absolute privilege: "Absolute Immunity in
Defamation: Judicial Proceedings").
96. 99 Cal. App. 3d 988, 160 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1979).
97. Id. at 991, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
98. Id. at 989, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 14
tended" to other causes of action; and it could, therefore, no longer be
assumed that the privilege must be confined to slanderous or libelous
statements.99
The Portman court misinterpreted the decisions granting the privi-
lege in actions other than defamation; and in so doing, it set a prece-
dent for further broadening of the privilege rather than confining it
within manageable bounds. In each of the cases cited by the court, the
basis of the action was a defamatory statement made in a proceeding.100
For example, in Pettit °'0 the statement, made in opposition to a zoning
variance, was allegedly false or forged and injurious to plaintiff's con-
tinued business operations.' 2 Since the publication was otherwise
privileged as an injurious falsehood, all the theories of recovery ad-
vanced by plaintiff failed, including fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.'0 3 Simi-
larly, in Brody v. Montalbano, "° the statements were allegedly defama-
tory allegations made by parents to other parents and to the school
board concerning the conduct of a vice principal.10 5 The defamatory
publications were within the privilege since they were made in prepara-
tion for a protected proceeding, and designed to prompt official ac-
tion."0 6 Thus, all the plaintiff's theories of recovery failed, including
not only defamation, but also malicious prosecution, conspiracy to in-
terfere with prospective advantage, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.' 7 Therefore, the privilege has not been "extended" to
protect nondefamatory statements. Rather, the courts, in the previous
cases, focused on the facts of the case instead of the theory of recovery,
and did not permit a cause of action based on the defamatory nature of
a communication which was itself privileged under the defamation
laws.' 08
To promote uniform application of the privilege and to allow the
courts to draw lines beyond which the privilege will not extend, the
99. Id. at 991, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
100. See also note I10 infra.
101. Pettit v. Levy, 28 Cal. App. 3d 484, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1972).
102. Id. at 487, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
103. Id.
104. 87 Cal. App. 3d 725, 151 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1978).
105. Id. at 729-31, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 209-10.
106. Id. at 733-34, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
107. Id. at 728, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
108. Id. at 738-39, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 215. It should be noted that in Portman, the injured
parties were not the subject of the publication and suffered no injury to reputation, as is the usual
case when a defamatory statement is protected by the privilege. Instead, they suffered financial
detriment as a result of reliance on the representation that the insurance company was financially
sound. In addition, the publication was made, not in a truth-finding phase of the proceeding, but
in a nonadvocacy, procedural function. The decision appears to be an aberration. See 99 Cal.
App. 3d 988, 990-92, 160 Cal. Rptr. 505, 506-507.
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immunity should be limited to statements which are defamatory in na-
ture. This does not mean, however, that a plaintiff can circumvent the
protection of section 47(2) by bringing the action under a theory of
recovery other than defamation. °9 If the publication comes within the
privilege, it cannot be used to establish an essential element in any tort
action to which absolute privilege is a defense." 0 Nonetheless, there is
one cause of action that is not defeated by the privilege even though the
statement leading to the cause of action is defamatory in nature.
2 Malicious Prosecution." Outside the Immunity of Section 47(2)
A malicious prosecution action may be brought against the publisher
of a defamatory statement when the otherwise privileged publication is
used to initiate or support an unsuccessful legal or administrative action
against the plaintiff."' In addition, the unsuccessful action must have
been initiated without probable cause and for an improper motive." 2
The policy objectives of the privilege are outweighed by the policy of
affording restitution for individual wrongs when these additional ele-
ments of an action in malicious prosecution are present." 3 In Califor-
nia, the tort will lie not only for criminal prosecutions, but also for civil
actions, including ancillary civil proceedings." 4 Moreover, the action
will lie for a maliciously initiated administrative proceeding." 5 Al-
though a defendant cannot be held to answer in damages for an other-
109. See Brody v. Montalbano, 87 Cal. App. 3d 725, 738-39, 151 Cal. Rptr. 206, 215 (1978);
Lerette v. Dean Witter Org., 60 Cal. App. 3d 573, 579, 131 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595-96 (1976); Agostini
v. Strycula, 231 Cal. App. 2d 804, 808, 42 Cal. Rptr. 314, 317 (1965).
110. See Kimball, Defamation: The Montana Law, 20 MONTANA LAW REVIEW 1, 29 (1958).
See generally SACK, supra note 13, at 385-479 (tort actions related to defamation). Theories of
recovery that fail when based on an otherwise privileged publication are generally those to which
privilege is a defense. These theories include intentional infliction of emotional distress, Kachig v.
Boothe, 22 Cal. App. 3d 626, 99 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1972); but see Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 66
Cal. App. 3d 893, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1977); interference with the practice of a profession, Good-
ley v. Sullivant, 32 Cal. App. 3d 619, 108 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1973); interference with prospective
advantage, Brody v. Montalbano, 87 Cal. App. 3d 725, 151 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1978); abuse of process,
Twyford v. Twyford, 63 Cal. App. 3d 916, 134 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1976); but see Younger v. Solomon,
38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1974); fraud, Pettitt v. Levy, 28 Cal. App. 3d 484, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 650 (1972); negligent misrepresentation, id; negligence, id; and disparagement of title, Al-
bertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295 P.2d 405 (1956), see also SACK, supra note 13, at 462. Other
actions to which substantially similar privileges apply are invasion of privacy, SACK, supra note
13, at 398; public disclosure of private facts, SACK, supra note 13, at 433-34; deceit, Janklow v.
Keller, 90 S.D. 324, 241 N.W.2d 364 (1976); and insulting language, Wade, Tort Liabilityfor_4bu-
sire & Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REv. 63, 92 (1950).
11I. Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 382, 295 P.2d 405, 410-12 (1956); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 51 at §653; Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 875, 924 n.323
(1956). See Thornton v. Rhoden, 245 Cal. App. 2d 80, 99-100, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706, 716-18 (1966),
for reasons why an abuse of process action cannot be based on an otherwise privileged
publication.
112. 46 Cal. 2d at 382-83, 295 P.2d at 410-1l.
113. Id. at 382, 295 P.2d at 410.
114. Twyford v. Twyford, 63 Cal. App. 3d 916, 921-22, 134 Cal. Rptr. 145, 147 (1976).
115. Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal. 2d 577, 580,311 P.2d 494, 496 (1957); Imig v. Ferrar, 70 Cal. App.
3d 48, 57, 60, 138 Cal. Rptr. 540, 544, 546 (1977). See Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior
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wise privileged communication unless it has been used to support an
unsuccessful legal or administrative action against the plaintiff, the de-
fendant may be made to answer for the wrong through alternative rem-
edies" 6 that focus on the character of the defendant's conduct.
D. Evaluating the Defendant's Conduct
Courts, unhappy with the inequity that results from granting the
privilege, seek to curtail the privilege." 7 Considering the character of
the defendant's conduct is a method the courts sometimes use. Unless
section 47(2) is changed by the Legislature from an absolute privilege
to a qualified privilege, however, the character of the defendant's con-
duct is an inappropriate consideration in determining whether the priv-
ilege exists. Rather, the defendant's conduct is an alppropriate
consideration only when determining alternative, nonmonetary
sanctions.
1. Malice as a Limitation on the Privilege
An absolute privilege grants an indefeasible immunity." 8 Thus, a
publication that is otherwise within the privilege is not made actionable
by a showing that it was made with malice." 9 In determining whether
section 47(2) applies, the publisher's purpose in uttering the defamatory
matter, his belief in its truth, or his knowledge of its falsity are not
proper matters of inquiry.120
Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465, 483-84, 551 P.2d 410,421-22, 131 Cal. Rptr. 90, 100-101 (1976), for similar
view regarding quasi-judicial proceedings of hospital boards.
If a publication is a complaint that results only in an investigation of the plaintiff, an action for
malicious prosecution will not lie. Brody v. Montalbano, 87 Cal. App. 3d 725, 736, 151 Cal. Rptr.
206, 214 (1978). But if the communication results in punitive action against the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff initiates and succeeds in a formal proceeding to annul the punitive action taken against
him, an action for malicious prosecution may lie even though the punitive action was taken with-
out a formal hearing. 70 Cal. App. 3d at 60, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 546. For example, if a parent's
complaint to a school board leads to the dismissal of a teacher after an investigation, and the
instructor succeeds in a reinstatement proceeding, an action for malicious prosecution may lie
against the parent. In addition, successful review by writ of mandate overturning a quasi-judicial
decision will also serve as the basis for an action. 17 Cal. 3d at 483-84, 551 P.2d at 421-22, 131
Cal. Rptr. at 100-101.
116. See generally Veeder, supra note 36, at 470-71.
117. See Bradley v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 826, 106 Cal. Rptr. 718,
723 (1973).
118. Casenote, 10 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 107 (1936).
119. 4 B. WrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts §294 (8th ed. 1974).
120. Instead, these considerations are only proper in determining applicability of alternative
sanctions. See RESTATMmENT, supra note 51, §586, comment a; SACK, Srpra note 13, at 268. Evil
intent, motive, ill will, lack of just cause, or bad faith are proper considerations only when the
court is applying a qualpFed privilege. See id
Malice in libel and slander is defined as: ". . . an evil intent or motive arising from spite or ill
will; personal hatred...;... intentionally publishing, without justifiable cause. . . acting in
bad faith and with knowledge of falsity of statement." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 862 (5th ed.
1979).
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The California Supreme Court acknowledged in Gosewisch v. Do-
ran' 2 ' that the statute grants an absolute privilege unaffected by mal-
ice.122 The court reasoned that had the Legislature intended lack of
malice to qualify the privilege, the qualification would be expressly
stated, as it is in other divisions of section 47. 123 Nevertheless, opinions
of appellate courts applying the privilege indicate that the courts give
weight to the defendant's motive or intent.
The most blatant example is the Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder1
24
decision. There the court considered defendant's motive in determin-
ing that a demand letter was written to gain an advantage in a civil suit
by threatening criminal prosecution. The court expressly based its de-
cision on a finding that the defendant's misconduct was inconsistent
with a privileged status.' 25
Other courts, although resting their decisions on different grounds,
also have given weight to the defendant's motive or intent in disallow-
ing the privilege. In Bradley, the court said the privilege should not
protect defendants who make filings in a judicial proceeding for the
sole purpose of defaming.'26 Similarly, in Younger v. Solomon, 127 the
court first discussed the defendant's purpose in making the defamatory
publication in an interrogatory before deciding that the privilege was
inapplicable. 28  These conduct evaluations by the courts ignore the
substance of the rule - that if the publication is privileged, no cause of
action is stated. Since the absolute privilege is not defeated by the com-
municant's frame of mind or ulterior motives, when it is asserted as a
defense, the inquiry should be limited to whether the communication is
privileged. 129
121. 161 Cal. 511, 119 P. 656 (1911).
122. Id. at 514-15, 119 P. 657-58.
123. Id. This view is supported by the wording of the 1927 divorce proviso, expressly requir-
ing that an allegation or averment in a divorce proceeding be absent malice before the privilege
attaches. See note 22 supra.
124. 66 Cal. App. 3d 893, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1977).
125. 66 Cal. App. 3d at 897, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
126. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 826, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 723. The Bradley court seems intent on rewrit-
ing the perimeters of absolute privilege. In Bradley, an opinion written by Justice Kane, the court
sets out "conditions" to the privilege, restates policy, and infers that motive is a proper considera-
tion to defeat the "absolute" privilege. Id. In a later decision, Frisk v. Merrihew, 42 Cal. App. 3d
319, 116 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1974) (also written by Justice Kane), the court indicates an acceptance of
the majority view that the absolute privilege applies to communications in a "proceeding author-
ized by law," but reverses a directed verdict for the defendant because it could not determine, as a
matter of law, whether the privileged occasion was abused Id. at 323, 326, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 782-83,
785. This is contrary to the majority view that only a qualified privilege may be lost by abuse.
See PROSSER, supra note 11, §114, at 776-77; SACK, supra note 13, at 268, 297; CommentAs Times
Goes By: Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and its Effect on California Defamation Law, 6 PAC. L.J. 565,
574 (1975).
127. 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1974).
128. Id. at 298, 301, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 119, 122.
129. See SACK, supra note 13, at 268.
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Unless the Legislature acts to expressly qualify the privilege in sec-
tion 47(2), the courts should consider the privilege absolute and refrain
from considering motive or intent.1 30 If a communication is absolutely
privileged, it should be privileged regardless of whether published in
good faith,13 ' technically deficient,' 32 criminal in nature, 33 an abuse of
the privilege,' 34 inaccurate and untruthful, 35 or published with mal-
ice.' 36 The single-minded view that an absolute privilege is granted
and that the defendant's mental state in making the statement is not a
proper consideration will lead to more uniform application of the privi-
lege. Any evaluation of the defendant's conduct should be confined to
determining the appropriateness of alternative measures of redress.
2. Alternative Measures
To afford the injured party an avenue of redress and to penalize the
wrongful publisher, while keeping the immunity intact for policy rea-
sons, nonmonetary measures are available. These alternative sanctions
include contempt, disciplinary action, and prosecutions for perjury; al-
though some courts doubt whether these alternatives are sufficient
deterrents. 137
Two courts, however, have accepted the concept of alternative sanc-
tions as the proper deterrent action in light of the policy objectives of
section 47(2). In Smith v. Hatch,'38 Hatch, an attorney who represented
a construction association in an action against a similar organization,
wrote a letter to a director of his client-association in which he accused
the opponent organization of skimming money by paying out organiza-
tion funds in the form of traveling expenses and legal fees to an attor-
ney named Smith and his associates. The court found the letter
absolutely privileged,' 39 and cited Friedman v. Knecht 40 in observing
130. See Gosewisch v. Doran, 161 Cal. 511, 514-15, 119 P. 656, 657-58 (1911).
131. Thornton v. Rhoden, 245 Cal. App. 2d 80, 93, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706, 716 (1966).
132. Frank Pisano & Assocs. v. Taggart, 29 Cal. App. 3d 1, 25, 105 Cal. Rptr. 414, 430-31
(1972) (technically deficient mechanics lien held privileged).
133. Pettit v. Levy, 28 Cal. App. 3d 484, 491-92, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650, 654-55 (1972) (allegations
of conspiracy to forge an evidentiary document did not militate against the privilege).
134. See PROSSER, supra note 11, §114, at 776-77; see also note 126 supra.
135. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 489, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
136. See Izzi v. Rellas, 104 Cal. App. 3d 254, 264-65, 163 Cal. Rptr. 689, 695 (1980).
137. See, e.g., Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 66 Cal. App. 3d 893, 896-97, 136 Cal. Rptr.
32 1, 323-24 (1977) (action for intentional infliction of emotional distress allowed to go forward on
a publication which constituted a breach of ethics); Younger v. Solomon, 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 296,
298-99, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113, 117, 119 (1974) (abuse of process action allowed on a publication that
amounted to a breach of ethics).
138. 271 Cal. App. 2d 39, 76 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1969).
139. 271 Cal. App. 2d at 47, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 355. In addition, the court granted the immunity
to republication at an association meeting, and to a request for continuance which contained the
same allegations. Id. at 50, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 355, 356-57.
140. 248 Cal. App. 2d 455, 56 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1967).
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that except for an "infinitesimal" number of cases, attorneys could be
adequately sanctioned by disciplinary action or contempt proceed-
ings. 41 In Friedman, the court held that the appropriate sanction for
slanderous innuendos in a verbal affray between a prosecuting attorney
and a defense counsel was disciplinary action or contempt
proceedings. 142
The decision of Iinnamon represents an opposing view. In Kin-
namon, an attorney, retained to collect a bad check, apprised the plain-
tiff check writer that his client would not only seek civil remedies but
would also pursue a criminal misdemeanor action. 43 The court found
the unethical conduct inconsistent with the privileged status afforded
by section 47(2) 144 and sufficiently outrageous to support an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 145 The case sets a precedent
by making an exception to the absolute privilege, an exception based on
the character of the defendant's conduct. Since the decision has not
been overruled, it provides a source for further inconsistency in appli-
cation of the privilege. Any plenary exception, such as that voiced in
Kinnamon, should come from the Legislature by way of an express
amendment to the statute. Until the Legislature acts to make express
exceptions to the privilege, 146 the courts should limit the evaluation of
the defendant's conduct to the appropriateness of alternative sanctions.
The defendant's conduct, along with the other considerations dis-
cussed above, has been used by the courts in defining and confining the
scope of the privilege. Only the consideration of relevance, however,
has evolved into a true limitation on the absolute privilege of section
47(2).
RELEVANCE: CONDITIONING AN ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE
The original 1872 wording of section 47(2) required the publication
to be pertinent and material to the matter being adjudicated. 47 The
1873-74 amendment eliminated this express requirement. The courts
have since struggled with whether the Legislature intended to abandon
the pertinency criterion; and if not, what the proper test of relevance
should be.
141. 271 Cal. App. 2d 39, 50, 76 Cal. Rptr. 350, 357 (1961).
142. 248 Cal. App. 2d at 462, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
143. 66 Cal. App. 3d at 895, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 322. To threaten criminal prosecution to gain an
advantage is a breach of ethics, subject to disciplinary action. Id. at 896, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 323;
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Rule 7-104 (1975).
144. 66 Cal. App. 3d at 897, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
145. Id. at 896, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
146. For example, communications amounting to a crime such as perjury, or a communication
which contravenes statutorily mandated conduct such as a breach of ethics might be excepted.
147. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol 14
Courts have taken inconsistent positions on the issue. Generally,
they have either avoided the issue by exercising judicial restraint,'4 8
emphatically held that there is no relevance requirement, 149 imposed a
minimal requirement,15 or imposed a strict relevance requirement.'51
To promote consistent and equal application of the privilege, a single
rule of relevance must be embraced by the Legislature and incorpo-
rated into the statute by amendment.
To understand the need for the amendment, the following discussion
will follow the chronological development of relevance from its appli-
cation at common law, through the controversy created by deleting the
requirement, through its evolution into a generally accepted limitation,
to the current conflict over the degree of relevance necessary for suc-
cessful assertion of the privilege.
A. Pre-1873-74 Amendment: Common Law Relevance
Prior to the 1873-74 amendment, section 47(2) applied only to publi-
cations made by witnesses in judicial proceedings.152 Therefore, 'when
the participant asserting the privilege was a nonwitness, the common-
law judicial privilege applied.
In Wyatt v. Buell, 5 3 the defendant dismissed the plaintiff as his attor-
ney after sustaining a judgment. Thereafter, he acted in propria per-
sona, requesting an extension of time to appeal the unfavorable
judgment. He explained that the delay was because of illness and lack
of legal representation. The suit was based on his expository comment
that the unfavorable judgment had ensued because of a collusive agree-
ment between his attorney and the adverse party.'54 The court held
that the statements were whollyforeign to the proceeding, and thus
were not privileged.1 55 In this decision the California Supreme Court
spoke decisively and stated the common law succinctly. This decisive-
ness would not occur after the 1873-74 amendment made the statute
applicable to all participants and deleted the pertinency requirement.
148. See notes 165-169 and accompanying text infra.
149. See notes 178-185 and accompanying text infra.
150. See notes 189-205 and accompanying text infra.
151. See notes 205-214 and accompanying text infra.
152. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
153. 47 Cal. 624 (1874). Section 47(2) at the writing of this decision contained a pertinence
requirement but the statutory privilege was available only to witnesses. See note 16 and accompa-
nying text supra.
154. 47 Cal. at 624-25.
155. 47 Cal. at 625. Had the court used the less stringent relevance requirement employed by
many courts today, the result would have been contra. See notes 194-199 infra. The statement
had "some relation" to the request for extension since it illustrated why the applicant was acting in
propriapersona and thus why his own illness prevented timely appeal.
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B. Section 47(2): Pertinency Deleted
The 1873-74 amendment'56 eliminated the requirements of perti-
nence and materiality. In Hollis v. Meux, 57 the California Supreme
Court declined to determine whether the Legislature intended to
change the relevance rule of Wyatt.'58 Instead, the court found the ac-
cusations of fraud, made in opposition to an insolvency action, were
relevant to the proceeding. Thus, it was unnecessary to decide whether
the Legislature intended to create a "conditional" or "absolute" privi-
lege,15 9 that is, a privilege conditioned or unconditioned by relevance.
The court's misuse of terminology further confused the issue.'
60
Then, in Carpenter v. Ashley, 16 1 the California Supreme Court con-
sidered relevance in applying judicial privilege, but ignored the statute
altogether and avoided any issue of legislative intent. Instead, the
court cited the decisions of other jurisdictions and treatises 62 to sup-
port its application of a nonstatutory judicial privilege. Statements by
a district attorney accusing defense counsel of perjury and subornation
of perjurylll were held unprivileged since they lacked pertinency, rele-
vancy, or reference to the criminal action in which they were made.164
By 1911 the amendment had been in effect for almost four decades,
but the California Supreme Court was still reluctant to make a decision
on the issue of pertinence or to address the issue of legislative intent. In
Gosewisch v. Doran,6 5 the court found the charges of embezzlement
relevant to the civil action by stockholders against the director and
president of a corporation.'66 Since the statements were relevant and
thus privileged in any event, the court refused to rest its decision on a
finding that the statute was limited by relevance. Instead, the court
languished in the backwaters of judicial restraint and emitted its most
indecisive pronouncement to date. The court said that if the privilege
was not absolute, the only limitation was that the "defamatory matter
must be pertinent and material to the cause or subject of inquiry before
the court;"' 167 that "[s]ubject to the possible limitation of relevancy and
156. See notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra.
157. 69 Cal. 625, 11 P. 248 (1886).
158. Id. at 629-30, 11 P. at 250.
159. Id. at 630, 11 P. at 250.
160. See notes 11-14 and accompanying text supra.
161. 148 Cal. 422, 83 P. 444 (1906).
162. Id. at 424-25, 83 P. at 445.
163. Id. at 422-23, 83 P. at 444.
164. Id. at 426, 83 P. at 445. See also Casenote, 10 S. CAL. L. REv. 105, 106 (1936). Since the
court makes no reference to the statute and does not cite California cases in support, the case lacks
precedential value as reasoned construction and application of section 47(2).
165. 161 Cal. 511, 119 P. 656 (1911).
166. Id. at 513, 515, 119 P. at 657-58.
167. 161 Cal. at 514, 119 P. at 657 (emphasis added). Note that the court uses the limiting
words of the original 1872 enactment. See note 16 supra.
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materiality, the privilege" was "absolute."16 '
With the California Supreme Court refusing to lead the way, and
indeed only weakly pointing the way, the appellate courts were left to
their own devices in construing the statute. One of these devices was
the wording of the 1927 amendment. 169
C. Section 47(2) Evolution of a Relevancy Requirement
The 1927 amendment restricted the privilege for certain publications
made in divorce proceedings. One of the limitations was a requirement
that the publication be material and relevant to the issues.
L 1927 to 1955: Conflicting Decisions
The appellate court in Reid v. Thomas1 70 boldly declared that with
the exception of the divorce proviso the privilege in section 47(2) was
without limitation, and therefore provided a complete defense. 7 1 As
long as the language complained of occurred in a judicial proceeding, it
was absolutely privileged 72 and could neither be libelous nor actiona-
ble under any circumstances.' 73 Thus, the Reid court did not consider
relevance a limitation.
Another court was willing to go along with this construction, but
only to a point. In Irwin v. Newby, 74 the court conceded that as long as
the publication was made in a judicial proceeding, the privilege ap-
plied. 75 A publication, however, was not in fact made in a proceeding
unless it had some, relation or reference to the cause at hand. 76 The
court thus required relevance, but only as a factor in determining
whether the publication had occurred "in" a proceeding, and not as a
direct limitation on the privilege.
A second court in the same appellate district as Irwin took a different
position. In Moore v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company,177
the court used the wording of the 1927 divorce proviso to construe sec-
tion 47(2) as an absolutely unconditional privilege.' 78 The court rea-
soned that the requirement of materiality and pertinency t79 in the
168. Id. at 515, 119 P. at 658 (emphasis added).
169. See note 22 supra.
170. 99 Cal. App. 719, 279 P. 226 (1929) (statements in a complaint of insanity).
171. Id. at 721, 279 P. at 227.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 102 Cal. App. 110, 283 P. 370 (1929) (libelous statements in a cross-complaint).
175. Id. at 113, 283 P. at 370.
176. Id. at 116, 283 P. at 370.
177. 122 Cal. App. 205, 9 P.2d 562 (1932) (libelous publication in a complaint).
178. Id. at 210, 9 P.2d at 564.
179. "Material and relevant" are the actual words of the proviso. See note 22 supra.
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proviso indicated legislative intent to confine the limitation to a special
character of action--divorce proceedings;180 that to extend the limita-
tion to all cases would render the proviso meaningless.18' Prior cases
finding a relevance requirement were summarily dismissed as decided
independent of the statute.' As for the Moore court, it declined to
claim any such independent law-making powers.1 83
Three years later, the same court declared that "[s]ince the language
in the section [was] clear, plain and unambiguous, there [was] no need
for construction or interpretation and its literal wording must be fol-
lowed;"' 4 the privilege was unconditional. This strict constructionist
view was not adopted by any other court.
2. 1956-1972: Germination of a Limitation
InAlbertson v. Raboff,t85 the California Supreme Court cited Moore
to support its statement that section 47(2) granted an absolute privi-
lege.'8 6 The court, however, cited non-California cases to support its
position that to be protected the publication must have a reasonable
relation to the action. 87
In Lewis v. Linn,'88 an appellate court noted that the issue of rele-
vance was still undecided but it did not address the issue directly.
Lewis, an attorney, sued Linn, a judge, for slanderous statements made
from the bench. The court found the statements relevant # relevance
was required and if the requirement was not construed in any strict
sense. 8 9 Thus, it was unnecessary for the court to rest its decision on a
finding that the statute was limited by relevance.' 90 The court, in dic-
tum, stated that relevance might condition the statutory privilege; but if
it did, it was not to be construed as a rigid requirement.' 9 ' Rather, it
180. 122 Cal. App. at 211, 9 P.2d at 564. But see Casenote, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 618, 621 n.30
(1939).
181. 122 Cal. App. at 211, 9 P.2d at 564.
182. Id.
183. Id. The court, however, ensured its decision by finding that the communication was ma-
terial to issues involved. Id. at 211-12, 9 P.2d at 564.
184. Donnel v. Linforth, 11 Cal. App. 2d 25, 29, 52 P.2d 937, 938, 939 (1935). Donnel dealt
solely with the proper construction of section 47(2). The. subject statements were made in a mo-
tion for new trial and accused the plaintiff of hog theft. Though the statements were unrelated to
the personal injury action against a railway company, the court held that the statements were
absolutely privileged; that section-47(2) was not limited by a relevance requirement. Id. at 27-29,
52 P.2d at 939. But see Casenote, 27 CALIF. L. REv. 618, 621 n.29 (1939) (critical comment).
185. 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295 P.2d 405 (1956) (Iispendens privileged).
186. Id. at 378-79, 295 P.2d at 408. Also cited for support was Gosewisch, a misapplication
since the court there did not assert that the privilege was absolute. Instead it held thatf it was not
absolute, the only limitation was relevance. See notes 165-168 and accompanying text supra.
187. 46 Cal. 2d at 381, 295 P.2d at 409 (not even Carpenter was cited as support).
188. 209 Cal. App. 2d 394, 26 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1962).
189. Id. at 399, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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should be given the liberal construction favored by the California
courts. 1
9 2
Indeed, liberal construction was the byword in the most well-rea-
soned decision on the issue of relevance. In Thornton v. Rhoden, 193 the
issue was whether the defamatory publication must have something "to
do with" the proceeding, and if so, what the appropriate lable was for
the requirement. 194 The court reviewed the case law and the amend-
ments to the code section. Irwin, 95 holding that a publication must
have some relation to the proceeding to have been infact uttered in a
proceeding, was regarded by the Thornton court as foreshadowing the
eventual reconciliation of the "somewhat confficting authorities." The
court concluded the proper test was that of the Restatement of Torts,
section 586: "does the utterance have "some relation' to the judicial pro-
ceeding?"' 9 6 At last, a court not only addressed the issue squarely and
concluded that there was a limitation, but it also promulgated a test.
The test was not stringently worded, but the court noted that all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the privilege.'97
The opinion in Thornton was soon followed by several other courts.
In Friedman v. Knecht, 9 ' the court found defamatory statements by the
prosecuting attorney against defense counsel absolutely privileged
under the broadly worded test of Thornton. 99 The Thornton test was
expressly adopted and applied in Smith v. Hatch2°0 as the "test in Cali-
fornia today."' '° In Rader v. Thrasher,20 2 the court cited Thornton as
the leading case on the absolute privilege of section 47(2).03 With this
acceptance by other courts, the Thornton test seemed to be well estab-
lished. Some courts, however, still found it difficult to resolve all
doubts in favor of the privilege, and, though citing the minimal rele-
vance test of Thornton, applied a strict relevance limitation.
192. Id. This view was subsequently followed by the Third District Court of Appeal in Jordan
v. Lemaire, 222 Cal. App. 2d 622, 625,35 Cal. Rptr. 337, 339 (1963). In Jordan, the court said that
for the privilege to be abrogated, the publication would have to be "palpably irrelevant" to the
subject matter of the controversy. Id.
193. 245 Cal. App. 2d 80, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1966).
194. Id. at 86-87, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
195. See notes 174-176 and accompanying text supra.
196. 245 Cal. App. 2d at 90, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 714 (emphasis added).
197. d. at 93, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16.
198. 248 Cal. App. 2d 455, 56 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1967).
199. See id at 460-62, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 544-45.
200. 271 Cal. App. 2d 39, 76 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1969).
201. Id. at 49, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 356. The court also adopted the Thornton view that all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the privilege. Id.
202. 22 Cal. App. 3d 883, 99 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1972).
203. Id. at 888, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 673. The citation was in support of the contention that the
privilege should be construed broadly in accord with the Restatement view. Id.
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3. 1973-Present: Current Conflict
The issue is no longer whether there is a limitation; it is settled that
the publication must have "some connection" with the proceeding.
The issue now is how tenuous the connection may be and still satisfy
the requirement.
In Bradley, the court used dictum fromAlbertson2° to further "con-
dition" the privilege. The court decided that not only must the utter-
ance have some connection with the proceeding, but it also must be
made to achieve the objects of the litigation. °5 Noting that the filings
by defendants were an apparent ruse to get defamatory statements to
the news media,206 the court concluded that the statements were "extra-
judicial" and thus nonprivileged, °7 though it conceded the filings had
"some relationship" to the action.20 8
A similarly restrictive position was taken by the court in Younger v.
Solomon.209 The defendant-attorney sent a set of interrogatories to the
plaintiff-attorney. The defendant's client, a victim of plaintiff's alleged
ambulance chasing, was suing for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Attached to the interrogatories was a copy of a complaint
against plaintiff to the State Bar.210 The court found the contents of the
letter within the privilege and clearly related to a claim for punitive
damages. 211 The concomitant disclosure, however, that the letter was a
complaint to the State Bar was held not privileged as having no logical
relation or connection with the action.21 2
If the Younger court had applied the Thornton test, the result might
have been different. Since the interrogatories sought information to
pursue punitive damages in a suit by one of the complainants listed in
the letter, it was possible for the court to find that the incidental publi-
cation had "some relation" to the proceeding. If the court had resolved
all doubts in favor of the privilege,21 3 it would have found the publica-
204. See notes 185-187 and accompanying text supra.
205. 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 824, 106 Cal. Rptr. 718, 722 (1973).
206. Id. at 826, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
207. Id. at 828, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
208. Id. at 826, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
209. 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1974).
210. Id. at 292-94, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 115-16.
211. Id. at 301, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
212. Id. One of the "conditions" promulgated by the Bradley court was that the publication
must have "some connection or logical relation" to the action. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 106 Cal.
Rptr. at 722. In allowing the abuse of process action to go forward, the court in Younger noted
that an ulterior motive may have been to make the complaint to the bar public, a potential breach
of a statutory rule. As the rule reads, however, it is directed at the activities of the State Bar and
the board of governors, not to one who files a complaint. Note 3 of the opinion discloses that the
defendant made a successful motion to compel answers after the plaintiff-attorney refused to an-
swer the interrogatory on the grounds that it was not relevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit.
213. See Thornton v. Rhoden, 245 Cal. App. 2d 80, 93, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706, 716 (1966).
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tion privileged and thus could not have reached the only issue de-
cided-whether the discovery process was used for an unintended
purpose.21 4
Some courts ignore the Bradley "conditions," ' 215 supporting their
findings with citations to earlier or more liberal cases. Other courts cite
Bradley and its expanded test of relevance;216 but their decisions reflect
the minimal Thornton test. In Twyford v. Twyford,217 the court found
the privilege protected an accusation of forgery, made in a request for
admissions.2 8 Though the restrictive test was quoted,21 9 the result was
the same as would have been achieved under the Thornton test.
Thus, the matter of relevance is still unsettled. While the relevance
requirement is now generally accepted, the courts do not agree on its
character or measure. Neither the California Supreme Court nor the
Legislature has elected to clarify a matter that is of concern to courts
and to participants in the judicial process.
D. Recommendation for Relevance
A single, simply stated, easily applied test of relevance would pro-
mote consistency in application of the privilege granted by section
47(2). A single test could incorporate both the Thornton and Bradley
views since the latter is primarily directed at the objectives of the pro-
ceeding. Since the matter has gone unsettled for well over a century,
the Legislature should take the initiative and incorporate the test into
the statute as a proviso. Section 47(2) would read: (underlining indi-
cates addition)
A privileged publication.., is one made-
2. In any (1) legislative or (2) judicial proceeding, or (3) in any
other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in initiation or
course of any other proceeding authorized by law ... ; provided,
that a publication made in a judicial proceeding shall not be a privi-
leged publication or broadcast unless such publication has some rela-
tion or reference to the purpose of the proceeding; ...
214. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 296, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
215. See Lerrette v. Dean Witter Org., 60 Cal. App. 3d 573, 576-77, 131 Cal. Rptr. 592, 594-95
(1976).
216. See Twyford v. Twyford, 63 Cal. App. 3d 916, 925, 134 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149-50 (1976).
217. 63 Cal. App. 3d 916, 134 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1976).
218. Id. at 919-20, 924, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47, 149.
219. Id. at 925, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50. A sidelight to Twyford is that, other than the vehicle
used for publication, it parallels Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 66 Cal. App. 3d 893, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 321 (1977). The accusation of criminal conduct was used to gain an advantage in a civil suit.
In Twvyford, however, the threat of prosecution was only implied. The ruse apparently was suc-
cessful as the husband, to whom the request for admissions was directed, neither admitted nor
denied, but he paid the sums the wife sought, and the request for admissions was not thereafter
pursued. 63 Cal. App. 3d at 919-21, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47.
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CONCLUSION
Civil Code section 47(2) was enacted to encourage free access to the
courts and to ensure the effectiveness of proceedings through free com-
munication. Unfortunately, the scope of the privilege is ill-defined and
the statute inconsistently applied. To achieve the objectives of the stat-
ute through uniform application, the Legislature and the California
Supreme Court must be willing to set clear guidelines for the privilege
by an amendment to the statute and by authoritative decisions.
This comment has focused on the problems of determining the
proper scope and application of section 47(2). In discussing the consid-
erations used by the courts in making these determinations, this com-
ment has proposed a policy statement as the focal point of the courts'
considerations; a statement that incorporates the dual objectives of en-
hancing the effectiveness of the proceeding and promoting unencum-
bered access to the courts and agencies.220 For use in determining
whether the person asserting the privilege has standing, this comment
has proposed a two-part test that incorporates the policy objectives and
provides an additional measure for keeping the privilege within man-
ageable boundaries.
In addition, a suggestion has been made to limit the privilege to
statements that are defamatory in nature. Moreover, it has been ar-
gued that evaluation of the defendant's conduct should be limited to
the appropriateness of alternative sanctions. The final recommenda-
tion was that the judicially-appended limitation of relevance be incor-
porated into the statute by amendment. The proposals and suggestions
are directed at achieving the policy objectives, promoting consistency
in application of the privilege, and providing more concrete measures
by which to keep the privilege within manageable bounds. Affirmation
or adoption of these proposals will not only clarify areas of uncertainty
and promote uniform application, but will also engender confidence in
those whom the statute was enacted to protect-judicial participants-
by providing dependable, equitable protection.
Sheila M. Smith
220. See notes 41-51 and accompanying text supra.
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